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We empirically study the market impact of trading orders. We are specifically interested in large
trading orders that are executed incrementally, which we call hidden orders. These are reconstructed
based on information about market member codes using data from the Spanish Stock Market and the
London Stock Exchange. We find that market impact is strongly concave, approximately increasing
as the square root of order size. Furthermore, as a given order is executed, the impact grows in time
according to a power-law; after the order is finished, it reverts to a level of about 0.5 − 0.7 of its
value at its peak. We observe that hidden orders are executed at a rate that more or less matches
trading in the overall market, except for small deviations at the beginning and end of the order.
I. INTRODUCTION
Market impact is the expected price change condi-
tioned on initiating a trade of a given size and a given
sign. One naturally expects that initiating a buy or-
der should drive the price up, and initiating a sell order
should drive it down. This has roots in standard eco-
nomic theory: An increase in demand should increase
prices, while an increase in supply should decrease prices.
Market impact is important for theoretical and practical
reasons. First of all, in order to be able to estimate trans-
action costs, and in order to optimize a trading strategy
to minimize such costs, it is necessary to understand the
functional form of market impact [1]. Moreover since
impact is a cost of trading, it exerts selection pressure
against a fund becoming too large, and therefore is po-
tentially important in determining the size distribution
of funds [2, 3]. Finally, market impact reflects the shape
of excess demand, which is of central importance in eco-
nomics. Despite its conceptual and practical importance,
a proper empirical characterization and theoretical un-
derstanding of market impact is still lacking [4].
The functional forms of market impact vary from study
to study. This is in part because there are several differ-
ent types of market impact that must be distinguished.
Studies of individual transaction impact yield a strongly
concave functional form which appears to vary from mar-
ket to market [5, 6, 7, 8]. Other studies have looked at
market impact under aggregation, in which the impact is
conditioned on the sum of the signed transaction volume
associated with a given number of trades or a given inter-
val of time. These studies have tended to observe a some-
what less strongly concave shape [4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13].
Other research has focused on orders executed through
specific mechanisms, e.g. block markets [14].
In this paper we instead focus on the impact of large
trading orders that are split into pieces and executed in-
crementally, which we call hidden orders. For strategic
reasons traders attempt to keep the true size of their
orders secret in order to minimize transaction cost. Con-
sider for example a trader who wishes to buy a large
number of shares of a company in order to profit on an
expected future price increase. She of course wishes to
buy her shares at the lowest price possible. As she buys
she will push the price up. However, by executing her or-
der incrementally she should be able to buy at least part
of the order at a low price, before the impact has been
fully felt, thereby lowering her overall cost. The strategic
reasons for this behavior have been studied in a model
by Kyle [15], whose theory predicts a linear dependence
of impact on trading volume. More recent theoretical
approaches [4, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23] have pro-
posed different functional forms for the market impact of
hidden orders.
Here we study the market impact of hidden orders as a
function of trading size and other properties, such as the
style of execution. We also study the temporal dynamics
of the impact as the order develops and after it has been
completed, and characterize statistical properties such
as the time profile for execution. There are so far only
a few studies of the market impact of hidden orders [24,
25, 26]. The main reason for this is that to study hidden
orders one must have the identity of the trading accounts
originating the orders, and data sets that contain this
information are difficult to obtain. The few empirical
studies in the literature considered a small set of hidden
orders executed by a specific financial institution who
made the data available to the authors of the paper. Such
studies suffer from the problem that they consider only a
fraction of the total number of hidden orders, which may
be idiosyncratic in character. This can also result in small
sample sizes and therefore large statistical fluctuations.
In this paper we follow a different approach and at-
tempt to reconstruct all large hidden orders using a sta-
tistical method that makes use of information about bro-
kerage firms, recently developed in reference [27]. For our
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2data sets each transaction is labeled with codes identify-
ing the members of the exchange who made the trans-
action. In most cases the member is acting as a broker,
i.e. they are handling a trade for another institution
who is not a member of the exchange. In other cases the
member may trade for their own account. Thus a single
membership code may lump together trades from many
different institutions, originated by many different trad-
ing strategies. As a consequence several hidden orders
from different trading accounts may be active with the
same broker at the same time, making it impossible to
be certain that all orders are correctly identified.
The detection problem is aided by the fact that the
size of hidden orders has a heavy-tailed distribution, and
large hidden orders can cause dramatic changes in the
rate at which a given membership code participates in
trades to either buy or to sell. The method we use was
originally developed for detection of local stationary re-
gions in physiological time series [28]. As we use it here, it
looks for time intervals in the time series of orders coming
through a given membership code when the firm acts as
a net buyer or seller at an approximately constant rate.
As in reference [27] we interpret these series of trades
as belonging to hidden orders. This method can never
be perfectly accurate, but a variety of tests performed
in reference [27] suggest that the reconstruction is good
enough to recover the most important statistical prop-
erties of hidden orders reasonably well. An important
advantage of this approach is that we are able to study
large samples of hidden orders coming from the whole
market rather than only a subset belonging to a specific
institution.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we
discuss our data sets, the algorithm for detecting hid-
den orders and the investigated variables. In Section III
we discuss the statistical properties of the variables char-
acterizing the hidden orders. In Section IV and V we
present our empirical results on the impact of hidden or-
ders and on their trading profile, respectively. Section VI
concludes.
II. DATA AND INVESTIGATED VARIABLES
Our databases contain the on-book (SETS) market
transactions of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) from
January 2002 to December 2004 and the electronic open-
book market (SIBE) of the Spanish Stock Exchange
(BME, Bolsas y Mercados Espan˜oles) from January 2001
to December 2004. Roughly 62% of the transactions
at the LSE are executed in the open book market and
roughly 90% of the transactions at the BME are executed
in the electronic market.
We have initially considered a subset consisting of the
most heavily traded stocks in the two markets, 74 stocks
traded in the LSE and 23 stocks traded in the BME. For
both markets we have considered exchange members who
made at least one trade per day for at least 200 trading
days per year and with a minimum of 1000 transactions
per year. This filter yielded approximately 60 exchange
member firms per stock. We then applied the algorithm
for detecting hidden orders described in Ref. [27], which
we have already discussed, to identify hidden orders that
consist of at least ten transactions. It is worth noting
that the detected patches are not necessarily composed
of the same type of trades (buy or sell) but that at least
75% of the transacted volume in the patch must have the
same sign. The algorithm detected 90,393 hidden orders
in the LSE and 55,309 in the BME.
This study is based entirely on trades that take place
through a continuous double auction. “Continuous”
refers to the fact that trading takes places continuously
and asynchronously, and “double” to the fact that both
buyers and sellers are allowed to place and cancel orders
at any time. There are two fundamentally different ways
to execute an order in such a market. One is to use a
limit order, in which an order is placed inside the order
book, which is essentially a list of unexecuted orders at
different prices. The other is to place a market order,
which we define as any order that results in an imme-
diate transaction. Every transaction involves a market
order transacting against a limit order. A given real or-
der might act as both, e.g. part of it might result in an
immediate transaction and part of it might be left in the
order book. We only consider transactions, so in the ex-
ample above we would treat the first part as a market
order and treat the second part as a limit order, but the
second part will enter our analysis only if it eventually
results in a transaction. The LSE database allows us to
identify whether the initiator of the transaction was the
buyer or the seller. For BME this information is not avail-
able and we infer it with the Lee and Ready algorithm
[29]
A hidden order is characterized by several variables.
These are
• The execution time T (in seconds) of the hidden or-
der, measured as the trading time interval between
the first and the last transaction of the hidden or-
der.
• The number N of transactions of the hidden order.
We consider hidden orders of length N > 10.
• The volume V of the hidden order defined as
V =
N∑
j=1
vj , (1)
where vj is the signed volume of each transaction
of the hidden order. For buy trades vi > 0 and for
sell trades vi < 0. We consider the hidden order to
be a buy order if V > 0 and a sell order if V < 0.
The buying/selling nature of a hidden order is thus
encoded in its sign,  = sign(V ). The volume is the
product of the number of shares times the price and
is measured in Pounds (LSE) or in Euro (BME).
3• The volume fraction of market orders fmo. A hid-
den order can be implemented with very different
liquidity strategies, i.e. with different compositions
of market and limit orders. In order to quantify
this we define the fraction (in volume) of market
orders within a hidden order as
fmo =
∑N
j=1 |vj,mo|∑N
j=1 |vj |
, (2)
where vj,mo is the traded volume at each transac-
tion done through market orders. Values of fmo
close to zero mean that the broker completed the
hidden order by using mainly limit orders, while
values of fmo close to one imply the broker used
mainly market orders during the execution of the
hidden order.
• The participation rate α of a hidden order defined
as
α =
∑N
i=1 |vi|
VM
, (3)
where VM is the unsigned volume of the stock
traded in the market concurrently with the hidden
order. Values of α close to zero imply the hidden or-
der was negligible compared to the activity in the
market, while values of α close to one mean that
most of the activity in the market came from the
transactions of the hidden order.
Summarizing, we expect that the market impact of a
hidden order is a function
r = f(N,V, T, fmo), (4)
plus possibly other variables specific of the stock, such
as the participation rate, the capitalization, the volatil-
ity, or the spread. We will now try to simplify this by
understanding some of the relationships between the de-
pendent variables and by conditioning on some of them
in our analysis. Note that in all the analyses and figures
we compute error bars as standard errors. It should be
born in mind that this procedure underestimates the er-
rors due to the heavy tails of the fluctuations and due to
possible long-memory properties of the data.
III. STATISTICAL PROPERTIES OF HIDDEN
ORDERS
We investigate the statistical properties of the variables
characterizing hidden orders. Ref. [27] considered a set of
3 most capitalized stocks traded at the BME and studied
the probability distribution of the variables characteriz-
ing the hidden orders and the scaling relations between
these variables. In Ref. [27] no restriction on the length
or on the fraction of market orders was set on the hidden
orders. The authors of Ref. [27] found that the distribu-
tion of hidden order size is fat tailed and consistent with
a distribution with infinite variance. They also showed
that this broad distribution is due to an heterogeneity of
scales among different brokerage firms rather than to the
heterogeneity of scales within the hidden orders of each
brokerage firm. By using Principal Component Analysis
(PCA) on the logarithm of the variables characterizing
the hidden orders, it was found that N , V and T are
related through scaling relationships
N ∼ V g1 , T ∼ V g2 , N ∼ T g3 . (5)
where g1 ' 1, g2 ' 2 and g3 ' 0.66 for 3 highly capital-
ized stocks in the BME and including all hidden orders.
We repeat the two dimensional PCA analysis of [27] on
our much larger data set. Figure 1 shows the value of
the three exponents for all the stocks as a function of
the number of hidden orders per year. We observe that
for stocks with a small number of hidden orders the het-
erogeneity in the value of the exponents is pretty large,
while, as the number of hidden orders detected by the al-
gorithm increases, the exponent estimations become less
noisy and tend to converge to similar values. Moreover
for BME stocks there is a clear trend of the exponents as
a function of the number of hidden orders. In order to
measure market impact in a statistically reliable way, we
pool together data from different stocks. We need there-
fore an homogeneous sample of stocks. To this end in the
following analysis we restrict our dataset to those stocks
for which our algorithm detects at least 250 orders per
year. These stocks are TEF, SAN, BBVA (as in [27]) but
also REP, ELE, IBE, POP and ALT for the BME mar-
ket and AZN, BSY, CCH, DVR, GUS, KEL, PO, PSON,
SIG, TATE and TSCO for the LSE market. Moreover, in
this paper we will focus mainly on short hidden orders,
considering the set of hidden orders of time duration T
smaller than one trading day. The reason for this choice,
detailed below, is to obtain stable statistical averages for
the market impact. Applying these two restrictions, we
obtain a final dataset that contains 14,655 hidden orders
in the BME and 11,165 orders for the LSE (see Table I).
We repeat the two-dimensional PCA analysis of [27] on
the pooled set of hidden orders from different stocks. We
find for the BME market the following exponents
g1 = 0.81 (0.79; 0.82), (6)
g2 = 1.57 (1.43; 1.72), (7)
g3 = 0.67 (0.65; 0.68), (8)
where quantities in parenthesis are 95% confidence in-
tervals obtained through bootstrapping the data. These
relations explains 83%, 61% and 80%, respectively, of the
variance observed in the data. For the LSE dataset we
get
g1 = 0.99 (0.98; 1.01), (9)
g2 = 2.41 (2.29; 2.52), (10)
g3 = 0.58 (0.57; 0.59), (11)
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Figure 1: Exponents gi (i = 1, 2, 3) of the allometric relations
of Eq. 5 for each of the stocks considered in our LSE and BME
databases and for hidden orders with N ≥ 10 and T < 1 day,
as a function of the number of detected hidden orders per
year. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals obtained by
bootstrapping the data. In the analysis of market impact we
consider only stocks with at least 250 hidden orders per year
(those in the white area of the figure).
Table I: Statistics of the hidden order ensembles used in the
paper. Only hidden orders with T < 1 day and N > 10
transactions are used.
Market # orders 〈N〉 〈fmo〉 〈α〉 〈R〉 〈R〉fmo>0.8
BME 14,655 95.58 0.52 0.17 1.127 3.983
LSE 11,165 97.53 0.53 0.34 0.587 2.156
and these relations explain 88%, 75% and 86%, respec-
tively, of the variance. These allometric relations are
roughly consistent with those obtained in Ref. [27].
The left panels of Fig. 2 show the probability den-
sity function of fmo and of the participation rate α. We
observe that the distribution of the fraction of market
orders is rather broad and is roughly centered around
fmo = 0.5. In addition two peaks are observed for
fmo ' 0 and fmo ' 1. For the BME the participation
rate has a peak around α = 5%, while for the LSE the
distribution of α is broader, and peaks at a value closer
to 20%. This value is pretty large and we do not have
an explanation for the difference in the participation rate
between the two markets. Finally, the two parameters α
and fmo are not independent. Figure 2 shows the ex-
pected value of α conditioned on fmo. For the BME the
expected value of α is almost constant except for very
small values of fmo. In contrast, for the LSE the depen-
dence is much stronger. The participation rate is higher
when fmo is at either of its extremes.
The bottom left panel of Fig. 2 shows that fmo has a
broad distribution. Hidden orders can therefore differ a
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Figure 2: Ensemble statistics of the fraction of market orders
fmo and participation rate α of hidden orders in both the
BME and LSE. Left panels show the probability distribution
function of both parameters, while the right panel shows the
conditional average of the participation rate conditioned on a
given value of fmo.
lot in terms of the fraction of market orders used to com-
plete them. In the investigation of the market impact of
hidden orders we will consider hidden orders character-
ized by a restricted set of values of fmo to better charac-
terize their profile with respect to the fraction of market
orders used to complete the hidden order. Specifically we
will use fmo > 0.8 (large fraction of market orders used)
and fmo < 0.2 (large fraction of limit orders used). The
reasons why we expect this distinction to be critically
important will be described in the next section.
IV. MARKET IMPACT
A. Definition
The main focus of this paper is the empirical mea-
surement of the market impact of hidden orders. Given
a hidden order traded on stock i between times t and
t+ T , we measure the market impact by considering the
change in the log price of the stock between time t and
time t+ T , i.e.
ri(t, T ) = log pi,t+T − log pi,t, (12)
where pi,t is the price of stock i at time t. We have used
for pi the midprice, but our results do not depend on
this. Our objective is to study how ri(t, T ) changes as
a function of the main properties of the hidden order.
Different stocks have different scales of their price fluctu-
ations. In order to be able to take the average of market
impact across different stocks, we rescale it by dividing
by the mean value of the spread si of the stock during
the year, where the spread is the difference between the
lowest selling price (ask) and the highest buying price
(bid). Specifically, we define the rescaled market impact
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Figure 3: Conditional average 〈R|T 〉 of the rescaled impact of
hidden orders (Eq. (13)) as a function of their time duration T
(symbols) compared to the average return of the stock market
index over random periods of the same time duration (solid
lines). The inset shows the price of the FTSE100 and IBEX35
indices over the period of study. In this figure we are using
all detected hidden orders without any conditioning on T or
fmo values but with N > 10.
as
Ri(t, T ) = iri(t, T )/si. (13)
where, as before, i = +1 for a buy hidden order and
i = −1 for a sell hidden order. Although we observe a
small asymmetry between the market impact of buy vs.
sell orders, similar to that observed elsewhere [31], for
the purpose of our study here we lump together buy and
sell hidden orders in order to obtain better statistics.
B. The noisy nature of market impact
While a given hidden order is trading there are typi-
cally many other orders trading at the same time, as well
as news arrival, and thus there is a considerable amount
of noise in the price change associated with any particular
hidden order. The price change associated with a hidden
order functionally depends on several factors, which can
be written
ri(t, T ) = R[rM (t, T ), ρi(t, T ), ηi(t, T )]. (14)
where rM corresponds to market-wide movements [25],
ρ is the average market impact of the hidden order, and
ηi is the background uncorrelated noise coming from the
trading of the rest of the market [12]. While the back-
ground noise can be controlled by taking averages over
different orders with the same properties or restricting
our analysis to very small values of T , market-wide move-
ments remain large, especially for large values of T . Dur-
ing the years 2001-2004 stock markets were in a substan-
tial decline for more than two years, only recovering at
the end of 2003 and 2004 (see the inset of Figure 3).
Figure 3 shows the conditional average 〈R|T 〉 of the
rescaled market impact of the hidden orders as a func-
tion of their time duration T . We observe that for T
larger than one day, rescaled impact is on average nega-
tive, irrespectively of the sign of the hidden order. The
reason for this phenomenon is that market-wide move-
ments were mostly negative for values of T larger than
one day. Only for hidden orders of duration close to or
below one day do we observe negligible changes in market
indexes when compared to price changes during hidden
order completion. This is the main motivation of our
choice of restricting our study to hidden orders of dura-
tion T less or equal to one day1.
C. Impact of limit orders vs. market orders
It is important to stress that market impact comes
about through changes in supply and demand, and that
this causes a strong a priori difference in the impact one
expects to observe in the execution of a limit order vs. a
market order. For example consider buy orders. A buy
market order reflects an increase in demand at the cur-
rent price. If sufficiently large it will cause a positive price
change. Since in a continuous double auction market or-
ders always execute against limit orders, this implies that
the sell limit order that the buy market order executes
against will generate a positive market impact. We there-
fore expect that executed limit orders have the opposite
impact of market orders: Buying drives the price down
and selling drives it up.
The problem with this line of reasoning is that we are
considering only executed limit orders, which creates a
strong selection bias. To measure the impact of limit
orders correctly we need to condition on all orders that
are placed, rather than only on those that are executed.
When this is done the impacts for limit orders should be
roughly the same as for market orders, as otherwise it
would be possible to make a profit by simply using limit
orders instead of market orders. If a buy limit order is
placed below the current price it is executed only if the
price drops. The probability of execution of a limit order
depends on future price movements: under an adverse
price movement the probability of execution is higher
than for a favorable price movement. This is caused in
part by the mechanical dynamics of a random walk, but
also by asymmetric information: Placing a limit order
gives others the option of executing at their will, when
1 Other authors [25] have proposed to use industrial sector indexes
as proxies for market-wide movements of a given stock and thus
the study can be extended to larger values of T . We do not follow
this procedure due to lack of that information.
6they have information that indicates it is favorable to
do so. This phenomenon is called adverse information.
When this is properly taken into account, limit orders
have impact in the direction one would expect, i.e. buy-
ing has positive impact and selling has negative impact
[32, 33]. Furthermore the magnitude of the impact of
limit orders when the selection effects are properly taken
into account is comparable to that of market orders.
For the BME we have a record of transactions but not
of orders. Thus to measure market impact and avoid the
selection bias associated with executed limit orders we
are forced to use only those hidden orders that are pre-
dominantly built out of market orders. For consistency
we analyze both the BME and the LSE data in the same
way.
In Table I we show the mean value of the rescaled
market impact R of Eq. (13) for hidden orders of du-
ration less than one day. We also show the mean value
〈R〉fmo>0.8 of the rescaled market impact computed over
the set of hidden orders with a large fraction of mar-
ket orders (fmo > 0.8). 〈R〉fmo>0.8 is significantly larger
than 〈R〉 indicating that hidden orders mainly composed
by market orders have on average a larger market impact
than hidden orders composed of both limit and market
orders.
D. Impact vs. N
Figure 4 shows the average over all hidden orders of
the rescaled market impact 〈R|N〉 as a function of the
conditioning variableN . This grows slightly as a function
of N , but one must keep in mind that the meaning of this
is difficult to interpret in view of the discussion above,
since we are averaging together a roughly equal number
of market orders and executed limit orders.
To investigate the average market impact and minimize
the effect of the selection bias, we divide the data into two
groups: liquidity providing hidden orders, with fmo <
0.2, and liquidity demanding hidden orders, with fmo >
0.8. As expected, for the former group the market impact
is on average negative, while for the latter it is positive.
Using ordinary least squares, we find that for both groups
the dependence of 〈R|N〉 on N is well described by the
power law
|〈R|N〉| = A Nγ . (15)
The estimated parameters are in Table II. In summary,
we find that the market impact of hidden orders domi-
nated by market orders is consistent with
〈r|N〉 ∝ sNγ (16)
where  is the sign of the order and s is the spread. For
hidden orders dominated by limit orders the market im-
pact is very similar to minus the impact of hidden orders
dominated by market orders.
Table II: Parameters of the fitting of the market impact with
Eq. 15.
Market Afmo>0.8 γfmo>0.8 Afmo<0.2 γfmo<0.2
BME 0.63± 0.17 0.48± 0.07 −0.63± 0.22 0.44± 0.09
LSE 0.17± 0.05 0.72± 0.10 −0.16± 0.14 0.64± 0.30
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Figure 4: Average rescaled market impact R for hidden or-
ders shorter than 1 day as a function of N for the BME (left)
and LSE (right). Circles are the results for all hidden orders,
while squares are the results when there is a low fraction of
market orders (fmo < 0.2) and diamonds are for when there
is a large fraction of market orders (fmo > 0.8). Dashed lines
are power law fits R ∼ Nγ . Values of γ are reported in Table
II.
For the BME the exponent is consistent with a square
root function while for the LSE the exponent of the im-
pact is slightly larger than 0.5. The square root depen-
dence is consistent with other studies and with the pre-
dictions of some models. The BARRA model [24] uses
an exponent 0.5 for estimating market impact. Almgren
et al. [26] found an exponent approximately equal to 0.6
for the temporary impact of hidden orders. The theories
of references [13] and [23] predict that the exponent of
the impact should be roughly 0.5, with the exact value
depending on the heavy tail of the volume distribution.
In Eq. (16) the spread gives the proportionality con-
stant, i.e. the global scale of the impact. By using the
results of Wyart et al. [34], who derive a proportional-
ity between the spread and the volatility per trade, it is
possible to rewrite Eq. 16 in such a way that the propor-
tionality constant is the volatility per trade.
E. Temporary vs. permanent impact
Finally we study how market impact builds as hidden
orders are executed and how the price reverts when the
execution is completed. Here we show the impact as a
function of time rather than of executed trades. In order
7to consider hidden orders of different length we normalize
the time by dividing it by the execution time T . With our
normalized time, the initial time of the order corresponds
to t/T = 0 while the final time is t/T = 1. We consider
only orders with fmo > 0.8. The results are shown in
Figure 5 where we see that earlier transactions within
the hidden order have more impact than later ones. In
fact we observe that
R ∼ (4.28± 0.21)× ( tT )0.71±0.03 (BME) (17)
R ∼ (2.13± 0.05)× ( tT )0.62±0.02 (LSE) (18)
We also observe that after the completion of the hid-
den order price drops, suggesting that not all of the
market impact is permanent. The tendency for rever-
sion has also been observed previously [14, 22, 25]. We
compare the impact at its peak when the order has
just finished, Rtemp = R(t = T ) (see Table 1), to the
permanent impact Rperm = R(t  T ) estimated by
averaging over a period 1.5 ≤ t/T ≤ 3. The drop
in impact is Rperm/Rtemp ' 0.51 ± 0.22 (BME) and
Rperm/Rtemp ' 0.73± 0.18 (LSE).
It is interesting to note that the square root impact and
the reversion can be predicted through a simple argument
based on the hypothesis that the price after reversion is
equal to the average price paid during execution [23]. If
during execution price impact grows like A×(t/T )β then
the average price payed by the agent who executes the
order is
〈p〉 = pt +A
∫ 1
0
(t/T )βdt = pt +
A
1 + β
, (19)
i.e. the permanent impact is 1/(β+1) of the peak impact.
In our case and using the exponents β obtained in figure
5 we get 1/(β+1) ' 0.58±0.01 for the BME and 1/(β+
1) ' 0.62±0.02 for the LSE which are statistically similar
to the ratios Rperm/Rtemp for each market.
V. TRADING PROFILE
In this section we investigate how hidden orders are
executed as a function of time, which we call the trading
profile. By this we mean the traded volume of the hidden
order as a function of time elapsed from the time of the
first trade. As before, in order to average across orders
of different length we use the normalized time t/T . We
measure the normalized average volume of each transac-
tion vi/〈vi〉 traded at time t inside the hidden order as a
function of the normalized time. Here 〈vi〉 is the average
volume exchanged in the individual transactions used to
execute the hidden order.
Figure 6 shows that trading within the hidden order is
fairly homogeneous except for the initial and final times
of the order, for which there is a small increase in the
traded volume. This can be understood if we look at the
concurrent trading in the market. In Figure 6 we see that
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Figure 5: Market impact versus time. The symbols are the
average value of the market impact of the hidden order as
a function of the normalized time to completion t/T . The
rescaled time t/T = 0 corresponds to the starting point of
the hidden order, while t/T = 1 corresponds to the end of
the hidden order. The rescaled time t/T is extended up to
t/T = 3 to study the permanent and temporal impact of the
hidden order. Solid lines are power-law fits (see text) while
dashed lines correspond to temporary (upper) and permanent
(lower) market impact. Temporary impact Rtemp is measured
at the end of the order t = T (see Table I), while permanent
impact Rperm is obtained through an average of the R(t/T )
with 1.5 ≤ t/T ≤ 3 obtaining Rperm = 2.03 ± 0.68 for the
BME and Rperm = 1.48 ± 0.06 for the LSE. Data is only for
hidden orders with fmo > 0.8.
the profile of the hidden order substantially matches the
concurrent trading in the market. In fact, the rise and
fall of concurrent trading is a bit stronger than it is for
hidden orders. The cause and effect of this phenomenon
is not clear: Does trading rise and fall because of the
pattern of hidden order placement, or do people placing
hidden orders try to match trading volume, e.g. through
VWAP (volume weighted average price) strategies?
As shown in Figure 7, the starting and ending of hid-
den orders is substantially correlated with overall volume
of trading in the market. In particular we see that a sig-
nificant fraction of hidden orders start at the beginning
of the day and finish at the end of the day. These are
the times of day in which the volume traded is larger,
corresponding to the well-known U-shaped volatility and
trading volume profile. Once again the cause and effect
is not clear. It has been shown that when impact of a
transaction decays gradually with time, the optimal trad-
ing strategy has a turnpike shape [4, 21, 35]. Thus this
might drive the end of day increase in trading, or alterna-
tively, the daily variation in trading may drive the profile
of hidden orders simply due to the desire to match traded
volume.
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Figure 6: Trading profile inside the hidden order. Average
volume of the transactions within the hidden order divided
by the average volume in the hidden order as a function of
the normalized time t/T . Circles are the results for all hidden
orders, while squares are the volume traded in the market (in
the same stock) concurrently with the hidden order. Data is
only for hidden orders with fmo > 0.8.
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Figure 7: Initial and final times of the hidden orders. Prob-
ability distributions of the initial time ti and final time tf of
the hidden orders, measured with respect of the time of the
day. Data is only for hidden orders with fmo > 0.8
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have empirically studied the main
properties of the impact and of the trading protocol
of intradaily hidden orders using a large fraction of ei-
ther market orders or limit orders. We have found that
the temporary impact of hidden orders is concave and
roughly described by a square root function of the hidden
order size. Moreover the price reverts after the comple-
tion of the hidden order in such a way that the permanent
impact is equal to roughly 0.5−0.7 of the temporary im-
pact.
We have also studied how the order is completed in
time and we have shown that more volume of the hidden
order is traded at the beginning and at the end of the
hidden order. When we take into account that hidden
orders are more likely to start at the beginning of a day
and are more likely to end near the end of the day, this
roughly matches the volume traded in the market.
The fact that we observe similar behavior in both the
London and Spanish stock exchanges, and that others
have also observed this in the New York Stock Exchange,
suggests the possibility of a “law” for market impact. It
will be very interesting to see whether this hypothesized
law continues to hold up under future studies.
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